CHILDREN/YOUNG PERSONS
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Children and Young Persons - Capacity of infant - Evidence
In the case of R v Velayuthan [1935] MLJ 277, the Court of Criminal Appeal, Malacca, was asked to consider the admissibility of evidence given by an infant. The accused, Velayuthan, was charged with murder. The prosecution called as a witness a boy aged 10 years who had seen the accused commit the crime. The defence objected to the admissibility of the boy's evidence on the ground that he was an infant and therefore not competent to give evidence.
The court held that the boy's evidence was admissible. The court said that the law does not make any distinction between the evidence of an infant and the evidence of an adult. The court said that the only question is whether the child is capable of understanding the nature of an oath and of giving a truthful account of what he has seen or heard. In this case, the court was satisfied that the boy was capable of understanding the nature of an oath and of giving a truthful account of what he had seen.
Children and Young Persons - Capacity of infant - Give good discharge
In the case of Re Abdul Salam, deceased [1938] MLJ 83, the High Court, Singapore, was asked to consider whether an infant can give a good discharge. The deceased, Abdul Salam, had died intestate. The only surviving relatives were his infant son and his widow. The widow applied to the court for letters of administration to the estate of the deceased. The defendant, the infant son, objected to the application on the ground that he was an infant and therefore not capable of giving a good discharge.
The court held that the infant could give a good discharge. The court said that the law does not make any distinction between the capacity of an infant to give a good discharge and the capacity of an adult to do so. The court said that the only question is whether the infant is capable of understanding the nature of the transaction and of giving a voluntary consent to it. In this case, the court was satisfied that the infant was capable of understanding the nature of the transaction and of giving a voluntary consent to it.
Children and Young Persons - Capacity of infant - Marriage
In the case of Re Maria Hertogh [1951] MLJ 164, the Court of Appeal, Singapore, was asked to consider the validity of a marriage between an infant and an adult. The marriage had been solemnized in accordance with the law of the Netherlands East Indies, which allowed for the marriage of infants. The defendant, Maria Hertogh, had been born in the Netherlands East Indies to Dutch parents. She had been brought to Singapore at the age of 4 years and had been adopted by a Muslim couple. At the age of 12 years, she had been married to an adult Muslim man. The plaintiff, the defendant's natural father, challenged the validity of the marriage on the ground that the defendant was an infant at the time of the marriage.
The court held that the marriage was invalid. The court said that the law of Singapore does not allow for the marriage of infants. The court said that the law of the Netherlands East Indies could not be applied in Singapore because it was contrary to public policy.
Children and Young Persons - Capacity of infant - Marriage - Consent of guardian
In the case of Re Lee Keng Gin & Anor [1935] MLJ 201, the High Court, Singapore, was asked to consider whether the consent of a guardian is necessary for the marriage of an infant. The plaintiffs, Lee Keng Gin and Lee Keng Lian, were the infant children of the deceased. The defendant, Lee Ah Huat, was the guardian of the infants. The defendant applied to the court for permission to marry the infants. The plaintiffs objected to the application on the ground that the consent of a guardian is necessary for the marriage of an infant.
The court held that the consent of a guardian is necessary for the marriage of an infant. The court said that the law does not allow for the marriage of an infant without the consent of a guardian. The court said that the purpose of this requirement is to protect the interests of the infant.
Children and Young Persons - Capacity of infant - Next friend
In the case of Re Brooke David, deceased [1937] MLJ 231, the Court of Appeal, Singapore, was asked to consider whether an infant can be appointed as a next friend. The deceased, Brooke David, had died intestate. The only surviving relative was his infant son. The infant son applied to the court to be appointed as the next friend of the estate of the deceased.
The court held that an infant cannot be appointed as a next friend. The court said that the law does not allow for an infant to be appointed as a next friend. The court said that the purpose of the next friend is to protect the interests of the infant and that an infant cannot be expected to protect his own interests.
The court also said that the appointment of an infant as a next friend would be contrary to public policy. The court said that the public interest requires that the interests of infants be protected and that the appointment of an infant as a next friend would not be in the best interests of the infant.
The court therefore dismissed the application of the infant son to be appointed as the next friend of the estate of the deceased
Children and Young Persons - Capacity of infant - Evidence
In the case of R v Velayuthan [1935] MLJ 277, the Court of Criminal Appeal, Malacca, was asked to consider the admissibility of evidence given by an infant. The accused, Velayuthan, was charged with murder. The prosecution called as a witness a boy aged 10 years who had seen the accused commit the crime. The defence objected to the admissibility of the boy's evidence on the ground that he was an infant and therefore not competent to give evidence.
The court held that the boy's evidence was admissible. The court said that the law does not make any distinction between the evidence of an infant and the evidence of an adult. The court said that the only question is whether the child is capable of understanding the nature of an oath and of giving a truthful account of what he has seen or heard. In this case, the court was satisfied that the boy was capable of understanding the nature of an oath and of giving a truthful account of what he had seen.
Children and Young Persons - Capacity of infant - Give good discharge
In the case of Re Abdul Salam, deceased [1938] MLJ 83, the High Court, Singapore, was asked to consider whether an infant can give a good discharge. The deceased, Abdul Salam, had died intestate. The only surviving relatives were his infant son and his widow. The widow applied to the court for letters of administration to the estate of the deceased. The defendant, the infant son, objected to the application on the ground that he was an infant and therefore not capable of giving a good discharge.
The court held that the infant could give a good discharge. The court said that the law does not make any distinction between the capacity of an infant to give a good discharge and the capacity of an adult to do so. The court said that the only question is whether the infant is capable of understanding the nature of the transaction and of giving a voluntary consent to it. In this case, the court was satisfied that the infant was capable of understanding the nature of the transaction and of giving a voluntary consent to it.
Children and Young Persons - Capacity of infant - Marriage
In the case of Re Maria Hertogh [1951] MLJ 164, the Court of Appeal, Singapore, was asked to consider the validity of a marriage between an infant and an adult. The marriage had been solemnized in accordance with the law of the Netherlands East Indies, which allowed for the marriage of infants. The defendant, Maria Hertogh, had been born in the Netherlands East Indies to Dutch parents. She had been brought to Singapore at the age of 4 years and had been adopted by a Muslim couple. At the age of 12 years, she had been married to an adult Muslim man. The plaintiff, the defendant's natural father, challenged the validity of the marriage on the ground that the defendant was an infant at the time of the marriage.
The court held that the marriage was invalid. The court said that the law of Singapore does not allow for the marriage of infants. The court said that the law of the Netherlands East Indies could not be applied in Singapore because it was contrary to public policy.
Children and Young Persons - Capacity of infant - Marriage - Consent of guardian
In the case of Re Lee Keng Gin & Anor [1935] MLJ 201, the High Court, Singapore, was asked to consider whether the consent of a guardian is necessary for the marriage of an infant. The plaintiffs, Lee Keng Gin and Lee Keng Lian, were the infant children of the deceased. The defendant, Lee Ah Huat, was the guardian of the infants. The defendant applied to the court for permission to marry the infants. The plaintiffs objected to the application on the ground that the consent of a guardian is necessary for the marriage of an infant.
The court held that the consent of a guardian is necessary for the marriage of an infant. The court said that the law does not allow for the marriage of an infant without the consent of a guardian. The court said that the purpose of this requirement is to protect the interests of the infant.
Children and Young Persons - Capacity of infant - Next friend
In the case of Re Brooke David, deceased [1937] MLJ 231, the Court of Appeal, Singapore, was asked to consider whether an infant can be appointed as a next friend. The deceased, Brooke David, had died intestate. The only surviving relative was his infant son. The infant son applied to the court to be appointed as the next friend of the estate of the deceased.
The court held that an infant cannot be appointed as a next friend. The court said that the law does not allow for an infant to be appointed as a next friend. The court said that the purpose of the next friend is to protect the interests of the infant and that an infant cannot be expected to protect his own interests.
The court also said that the appointment of an infant as a next friend would be contrary to public policy. The court said that the public interest requires that the interests of infants be protected and that the appointment of an infant as a next friend would not be in the best interests of the infant.
The court therefore dismissed the application of the infant son to be appointed as the next friend of the estate of the deceased
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